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NATIONAL The Challenge of 
A Black Presidential 
Candidacy (1984):
By Robert C. Smith and Joseph R McCormick, II
(Last of two parts)
T he challenge of political independence, in many ways more difficult than the challenge of ideology, 
required that “[Jesse] Jackson be will­
ing and able to carry his insurgency 
into the general election as an inde­
pendent candidate if the Democratic 
Party yield [ed] to the pressure of its 
right wing and repudiate [ed] its pro­
gressive heritage and the liberal 
agenda. ” 32 The basic impetus of this chal­
lenge was to end the “captive” status of the 
Black vote. In this regard, we quoted Pro­
fessor Ronald Walters:
“The major candidates and the party ap­
paratus have believed that the Black vote is 
a captured vote, unable to mount credible 
strategies of leverage, so the tendency in­
creasingly has been to ignore both the im­
portance of the vote and the policy interests 
it represents. Therefore, in an effort to 
maintain the credibility of the threat of 
Blacks to retaliate if there is no bargaining, 
the option has to remain open for Blacks to 
threaten the Democratic Party with defeat 
even in the general election by supporting 
either a Black candidate or a third party 
candidate. ” 33
We emphasized, however, that “an in­
dependent challenge should be undertaken 
only if the Democratic nominee and the 
party’s platform reject a liberal and pro­
gressive agenda. ”34
Since the Democratic Party did not, in 
its nominees and platform, clearly re­
pudiate the liberal ideology, there was not 
a clear-cut basis for an independent Jack- 
son challenge in the general election. In 
addition, Jackson’s failure during the cam­
paign to articulate a clear set of progres­
sive alternatives further blunted the im­
perative of an independent challenge. Cer­
tainly there was no basis for such a chal­
lenge on the issue of the second primary 
and the related rules challenges set forth 
by Jackson. Thus, the centrist Democratic
nominee and platform, and Jackson’s fail­
ure to articulate an alternative progressive 
vision, rendered the challenge of political 
independence moot.
Yet in a large survey of Black voters 
conducted by the University of Michigan’s 
National Black Election Study, 60% of the 
respondents stated they would have voted 
for Jackson if he had run as a third party 
candidate.35 Additionally, 45% of the re­
spondents felt that Blacks should form 
their own political party, suggesting that 
“blacks would switch their party allegiance 
from the Democratic party if an alternative 
was presented which they felt better ar­
ticulated the interests of blacks.”36 These 
data suggest that, in spite of the absence of 
a clear ideological imperative for an inde­
pendent challenge, Jackson nevertheless 
might have received substantial support 
among the masses of Blacks.
Jackson, early in the primary season, 
publicly toyed with the idea of an inde­
pendent candidacy,37 but he apparently 
never gave it serious consideration, in 
part, because he had pledged his “word of 
honor” to his principal Black leadership 
supporters that he would support the
Democratic nominee. Also, there was 
concern that he lacked the necessary or­
ganization and financing to mount an ef­
fective national campaign, especially 
given the complexity of obtaining ballot 
positions in all 50 states.
The challenge of political independ­
ence was therefore a failure — a fail­
ure in the sense that the captive 
status of the Black vote was not al­
tered in 1984. The Republicans and 
President Reagan, as usual, ig­
nored the Black vote and the Dem­
ocratic nominee, Walter Mondale, 
took it for granted. President 
Reagan made absolutely no at­
tempt to appeal to the Black 
community or its policy con­
cerns and Mondale, after the convention, 
ignored the policy concerns of Blacks and 
instead relied on the Black community’s 
fears of a second Reagan term (especially 
with respect to Supreme Court appoint­
ments) as the central theme of his appeal 
to the Black electorate.
Mondale even ignored the minimalist 
demands of Black leaders set forth at the 
post-convention “Minnesota Summit” 
which called for, among other things, high 
level Black representation in his campaign, 
control of party registration funds in the 
Black community and a major policy 
speech on South Africa.38 Indeed, Mon­
dale did not campaign in the Black commu­
nity until the final weeks of the election and 
then sought largely to appeal to the com­
munity’s hostility to Reagan rather than to 
its legitimate policy interests.
These characteristics of the Democratic 
campaign led some Blacks — notably 
Ronald Walters — to call for a boycott of 
the presidential ballot in the general elec­
tion, and may have contributed to disaffec­
tion with the Democratic ticket in the 
Black community and a lower turn-out in 
November than otherwise might have oc­
curred.
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The Question of Political Independence
One final point: Although the challenge 
of Black political independence did not ma­
terialize insofar as the general election is 
concerned, Jackson’s primary challenge 
“could be characterized as a ‘third party 
movement’ within the traditional two- 
party system.”39 And Jackson’s demon­
stration of the capacity of a Black candidate 
to “nationalize the Black vote” establishes 
the precedent that, within the Democratic 
Party, the Black vote can no longer be 
taken for granted and must be bargained 
for with policy and patronage, at least dur­
ing the nomination process.
This new reality resulting from the Jack- 
son campaign should have a major effect on 
the calculations of those Democratic 
politicians (Massachusetts Senator Ed­
ward Kennedy and New York Governor 
Mario Cuomo, for example) who might 
seek in 1988 and beyond to represent the 
liberal principles and constituencies of the 
party.
Blacks constitute the core liberal consti­
tuency in the Democratic Party and repre­
sent more than 20% of the party’s national 
vote.40 If the party’s Fairness Commission 
reshapes the delegate allocation rules so 
that they correspond more closely to the 
one-man, one-vote principle of pro­
portional representation, then a Black 
candidate in a multi-candidate Democratic 
nomination contest should possess en­
hanced leverage and bargaining power.
Thus, Jackson’s primary challenge of 
1984 suggests that Blacks should be in a 
stronger position to exert influence on the 
Democratic Party as it seeks to chart a 
new direction in the aftermath of the third 
landslide Republican victory in the last four 
presidential elections.
The General Election
In his landslide defeat of Mondale (61% of 
the popular vote, 49 states and 525 of the 
538 electoral voters) President Reagan 
won the support of virtually all categories 
of the population in terms of gender, age,
ethnicity, region, education, occupation 
and income. Mondale received majority 
support only among Blacks (90%), His- 
panics (65%), Jews (66%), those with the 
lowest income (53%), the unemployed 
(66%), and union households (53%).41
Given the margin of Reagan’s victory, 
the Black vote’s impact on the outcome of 
the election was negligible. Jesse Jackson 
and other Black leaders had anticipated 
that increased Black registration and vot­
ing in the election might provide the Dem­
ocratic candidate’s margin of victory in a 
close contest, but Reagan also carried the 
first time voter in 1984 by the same land­
slide margin of 60 to 39 percent.
One of the interesting features of the 
1984 general election was the discovery by 
journalists of the phenomenon of racial 
polarization in the electorate as evidenced 
by the fact that 90% of Blacks supported 
the Democratic ticket while 66% of whites 
supported the Republican ticket. Yet this 
degree of racial cleavage in the electorate 
is not new, nor is it attributable to the Jack- 
son candidacy. Rather, as Ronald Walters 
points out, “except for the election of 1964 
whites have not voted in a majority for a 
Democratic presidential candidate going 
all the way back to 1944. In addition, since 
1968, the average white vote for a Demo­
cratic presidential candidate has been 
38%, but the black vote has averaged 89% 
for the Democratic candidate.”42 The key 
to understanding the source and depth of 
this partisan racial cleavage is the 1964 
presidential election.
In 1964 the Republican Party nominated 
Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater as its 
presidential candidate. Goldwater, a vig­
orous opponent of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 and the New Deal-Great Society so­
cial and economic reforms, was opposed 
by President Lyndon Johnson, the cham­
pion of civil rights and the Great Society. 
Beginning with the election of 1964, there 
has been a gradual but steady realignment 
of voter support for the major parties on
the basis of race. (As late as 1960 Richard 
Nixon, the Republican nominee, received 
approximately one-third of the Black vote 
in his race against President Kennedy.) 
Thus, present day racial polarization in the 
electorate emerged in 1964 as a result of 
the Democratic Party’s implementation of 
the civil rights acts of the 1960s.
Edward Carmines and James Stimson, 
leading authorities on the survey data deal­
ing with the racial orientation of the elec­
torate put it this way:
“It was arguably the case that issues of race 
were not partisan issues as recently as 
1960. Advocates of racial liberalism were to 
be found about equally among northern 
Democrats and Republicans. . . .  Neither 
party found it advantageous to stake out 
distinctive positions on the potentially vol­
atile issue and citizens responded accord­
ingly. [But] after at least a decade of simi­
larity to the Democrats, Republican 
identifiers moved to the racial ‘right’ in 
1964... . Those who report first identifying 
with the GOP in that year are strikingly 
more segregationist than any other group of 
identifiers. . . .  The 1964 election thus ap­
peared to mark a sharp and durable change 
in the racial policy preferences of party sup­
porters, leaving Democrats more support­
ive of using the federal government to en­
sure the rights of blacks. This is prelimi­
nary evidence that the 1964 election was a 
‘critical’ election, reorienting the attitudi- 
nal base of the two major parties. ” 43
This shift in the segregationist or racist 
vote from the Democratic Party to the Re­
publican Party was not simply a reaction to 
the perceived liberalism of the Johnson 
Administration, rather it was a rational re­
sponse to the right wing Republican strat­
egy of, “going hunting where the ducks 
are,” to use Senator Goldwater’s phrase.
The initial assumption of conservative 
Republican strategists was that most of 
the “ducks” (anti-Black voters) were to be 
found in the South, since Goldwater car­
ried the Deep South states in 1964. How­
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ever, the success of Alabama Governor 
George Wallace’s several presidential can­
didacies demonstrated that there was a 
significant anti-Black vote to be found out­
side the South. The historical significance, 
therefore, of the Wallace campaigns was 
their demonstration of the size and de­
mography of the racist vote and the nature 
of the strategy necessary to obtain it.44
The 1968 Nixon campaign, with its 
anti-busing, anti-Great Society and “law 
and order” rhetoric, represented the be­
ginnings of the successful conservative 
Republican effort to eliminate the Wallace 
phenomenon by drawing his constituency 
of traditional Democrats into the Republi­
can electoral base. Since 1968, every Re­
publican presidential candidate has pur­
sued this strategy, sometimes subtly, 
sometimes not so subtly. As a result, racial 
polarization in the electorate has remained 
fairly constant.
In the early 1970s, political scientist 
Matthew Holden, Jr., analyzed the strate­
gic basis of the phenomenon the following 
way:
" ... the chances are that the Republican 
Party will [choose] to consolidate a na­
tional majority on an anti-black basis.. . .  
We may believe that the party would become 
the center of resistance born of a general­
ized unease about ‘things going sour, ’ that 
this generalized unease is anti-reform and 
would under some circumstances be func­
tionally equivalent to ‘anti-black. ’ To 
capitalize upon such an unease would sim­
ply become the most economical way for the 
party to take care of its own organizational 
interests. ” 45
Edward Carmines and James Stimson in 
their work make clear that it is not accu­
rate to describe one party as racist and the 
other as anti-racist, but the data they sug­
gest do indicate that “racial attitudes are 
not only performing the structuring func­
tions associated with the liberalism- 
conservatism dimension but much of the 
meaning of this ideological dimension is 
also racial in nature.” In other words, to 
many Americans, conservatism is the 
functional equivalent of racism. Black 
Americans intuitively understand this and 
it is for this reason that conservative ad­
ministrations are widely viewed in the 
Black community as racist. And it is for 
this reason, too, that a large segment of 
the white electorate (perhaps as large as 
20%) continues to resent the 1960s civil 
rights revolution and turns, except during 
times of serious economic dislocations, to
conservative Republican candidates. This, 
sadly, is the real meaning of the racial 
polarization “discovered” in the 1984 elec­
tion.
A final point on the general election, the 
question of realignment: Does the 1984 
election represent the displacement of the 
dominant New Deal-based Democratic 
governing majority by a new Republican 
political majority? This question, since 
1964, has been the “external question” for 
students of American national elections.47 
Although it will take another year or so to 
analyze the surveys and other data on the 
ideological meaning of the 1984 election, it 
is probable that Warren Miller, principal 
investigator for the 1984 National Election 
Study, will be found correct in his predic­
tion that:
Given the margin of Rea­
gan s victory, the Black 
vote’s impact on the out­
come of the election was 
negligible.
. . We will find that very little has 
changed in the basic contours of Democra­
tic and Republican partisanship. There 
may be a one or two point gain for the Re­
publicans, just as the Democrats gained 
one or two points after the 1964 elections. 
But this ivill probably disappear by 1986, 
and we will then conclude that this election 
did not change us from a nation that is 
fundamentally Democratic to one that is 
Republican. Because the data indicate that 
the President simply won a popularity con­
test on November 6, it is a mistake to draw 
inferences about the policy preferences of 
the Nation from this. The new Congress, I  
believe, will reflect the fact that policy pref­
erences of the American people have not 
changed markedly. 48
It is likely that for the next several elec­
tions neither of the two major parties will 
command a stable and enduring national 
political majority at the presidential level. 
Thus, rather than realignment, we are 
likely to see the continued decomposition
of both the Republican and Democratic
Parties.49
Conclusion
In this report we have attempted, on the 
basis of the available data, to present a 
preliminary assessment of the Rev. Jesse 
Jackson’s 1984 presidential campaign. Be­
cause of the nature of the process of politi­
cal inquiry, our assessment is tentative and 
we make no claims to having presented 
here the last word on the phenomenon. 
Rather, in the months and years ahead 
there are likely to be scores of confer­
ences, symposia, articles, essays and 
books that will place the Jackson campaign 
and related Black electoral activity in a his­
torical and conceptual framework that will 
yield more definitive insight on what the 
Jackson challenge might mean for Ameri­
can politics generally.
Now, we offer some final generalizations 
and a hypothesis about the long-term ef­
fects of the campaign on Afro-American 
politics and on the American party system.
First, Jesse Jackson’s very entry into 
the race is of great long-term symbolic sig­
nificance, altering in an important way the 
symbolic understanding of the “place of 
Blacks” in American society. This is espe­
cially important for young people of both 
races because no longer are successful 
Black symbols and images limited to Re­
ggie [Jackson] and Michael Jackson but in­
stead there is Jesse Jackson and the image 
of a Black man competing with compe­
tence and style for the highest office in the 
land, not merely on the athletic field or the 
entertainment stage.
Second, there is preliminary evidence 
from the University of Michigan’s National 
Black Election Study that the Jackson 
campaign increased grassroots race con­
sciousness and solidarity and encouraged 
large numbers of heretofore uninvolved 
Blacks to become politically active.50 This 
political involvement went beyond the 
simple act of voting to include canvassing, 
fund raising, scheduling and other routines 
of campaign organization.
Related to this increased consciousness 
and activism, the unprecedented experi­
ence' of planning and staffing a national 
presidential campaign yielded a new cadre 
of experienced political operatives pos­
sessing a valuable body of expertise and a 
nationwide network that might be acti­
vated in future local, state and national 
campaigns. As a result of these devel­
opments, scholars and journalists are al­
ready reporting increased Black political
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movement and influence in a number of 
local and state jurisdictions.51
Third, the experience gained in 1984 in 
campaign organization, financing, media 
relations and strategy development and 
day-to-day campaign management should 
prove valuable in the future. The Rainbow 
Coalition has become a permanent organi­
zation headquartered in Washington and 
Jackson has indicated that he is “keeping 
his options open” for the 1988 election. 
The precedent of the Jackson campaign is 
also likely to encourage other Black politi­
cians to seek their parties’ presidential 
nominations.
Finally, the Jackson insurgency in 1984 
represents the emergence of a potentially 
viable independent Black power base in­
side the Democratic Party and that poten­
tial suggests that the Democratic Party 
coalition, as it is presently constituted, is 
in serious trouble. If Blacks in the party 
insist (as they ought) in 1988 and there­
after on their fair share of party patronage 
and decision-making positions (roughly 20 
percent) and on respect and due considera­
tion for their predominantly liberal 
ideological policy perspectives,52 it is not 
likely that the current tenuous coalition of 
trade unions, Blacks, Jews, liberals and 
white southern conservative “boll- 
weevils” can survive. Rather, the pros­
pects may be for either the reconstitution 
of the Democratic Party as a genuine pro­
gressive party of the left (as the Republi­
can Party, since 1964, is being 
reconstituted as a party of the hard right) 
with a significant Black base but without 
the “boll-weevils,”53 or alternatively the 
emergence of a new third party of the pro­
gressive left — again with a significant 
Black base 54
Recent developments in the British 
party system may portend the future in the 
United States: relatively pure parties of 
the left and right and a moderate party of 
the center.55 It is our hypothesis that the 
most basic long-term implication of Jesse 
Jackson’s campaign is that it may give addi­
tional impetus to the long anticipated fun­
damental transformation and realignment 
of the American party system. The chal­
lenge of a Black presidential candidacy of 
1984, therefore, represents the beginning 
of a new direction for Blacks in presidential 
politics. But it is only a beginning. □
Robert C. Smith and Joseph P. McCormick, II are 
faculty members of the Department of Political Science 
at Howard University. The first part of their report 
was published in the April 1985 issue.
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